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The Clergy-Communicant Privilege: Blessed Are the Meek,
For They Shall Remain Silent
The clergy-communicant privilege, I like privileges in general, is an excep-
tion to the general rule that everyone should give testimony about facts within
his or her knowledge when called on by a court to do so.2 Unlike many eviden-
tiary rules, which exclude evidence because it is irrelevant or unreliable,3 privi-
leges are based on public policy concerns and a determination that the benefits of
preserving the secrecy of certain communications outweigh the need to have the
evidence admitted in court.4 Courts tend to construe privileges strictly and usu-
ally require that all the elements necessary to preserve the privilege must be
present before the testimony of a person with privileged information will be
excluded. 5
North Carolina General Statutes section 8-53.2 sets out the clergy-commu-
nicant privilege and states:
No priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science practitioner, or a clergy-
man or ordained minister of an established church shall be competent
to testify in any action, suit or proceeding concerning any information
which was communicated to him and entrusted to him in his profes-
sional capacity, and necessary to enable him to discharge the functions
of his office according to the usual course of his practice or discipline,
wherein such person so communicating such information about him-
self or another is seeking spiritual counsel and advice relative to and
growing out of the information so imparted, provided, however, that
this section shall not apply where communicant in open court waives
the privilege conferred. 6
The parameters of the privilege are defined by statute and any attempt to ex-
amine its scope requires a careful reading.7 This Note examines the clergy-com-
municant privilege and the elements that are necessary for the privilege to apply.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986).
2. See J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961 &
Supp. 1986).
3. See, e.g., N.C.R. EvID. 402 (1986) ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.");
N.C.R. EVID. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by statute or by these rules.");
N.C.R. EVID. 804(b)(5) (Hearsay statements not covered by exceptions are admissible under certain
conditions provided there exist "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.").
4. See State v. 62.96247 Acres of Land, 57 Del. 40, 52-53, 193 A.2d 799, 806 (Del. Super. Ct.
1963).
5. See, e.g., Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 37, 125 S.E.2d 326, 330
(1962) (applying N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1986), which protects certain hospital records). In Sims
the court examined the privilege afforded certain hospital records and stated that "[i]n some jurisdic-
tions the privilege statutes are strictly construed on the theory that they are in derogation of the
common law." Id.; see, eg., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 557, 561, 221 S.W.2d 87, 89 (1949)
(" 'The tendency of the courts is toward a strict construction of statutes making communications to
clergymen privileged, and.., only those communications are privileged which are made under the
exact conditions enumerated in the statutes.'" (quoting 58 AM. JUR. Witnesses § 532 (1948)).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986).
7. See In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 77, 152 S.E.2d 317, 324 (strictly construing the clergy-
communicant privilege), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918 (1967).
It examines the requirement that the communication be made to a minister act-
ing in his or her professional capacity, the requirement that the communicant be
seeking spiritual counsel at the time of the communication, and the requirement
that the communication be made in confidence. It also examines three recent
cases in which the North Carolina appellate courts have interpreted and applied
the privilege. The Note concludes that in two of these cases, the North Carolina
Supreme Court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals correctly interpreted
and applied the requirement that the communication be made to a minister act-
ing in his or her professional capacity. It also concludes, however, that the
supreme court, in its recent application of the requirements that the communi-
cant be seeking spiritual counsel and that the communication be made in confi-
dence, misinterpreted the wording of the privilege and may undermine the
policy objectives behind it.
In 1985 and 1986 the North Carolina appellate courts examined the clergy-
communicant privilege in three cases. In State v. Jackson 8 the court of appeals
confronted a situation in which part of a conversation between a minister and
her nephew involved the minister acting in a professional capacity, but also in-
volved a discussion of family matters between close relatives. In Jackson the
defendant was accused of raping his cousin and burglarizing her home.9 While
defendant was in jail awaiting trial, his aunt, the victim's mother-who was also
an ordained minister-visited defendant.10 During these visits the two talked
and prayed together, and in the course of their conversation defendant admitted
to his aunt that he had committed the crimes for which he was charged.11
At trial the aunt testified that she approached defendant "both as a close
relative and as a minister." 12 She told the court what defendant had said to her
and indicated that he admitted his guilt to her.13 Appealing from a verdict of
guilty on both counts, defendant claimed the trial court erred in admitting the
aunt's testimony because she was an ordained minister and, therefore, the com-
munication between her and defendant was protected by the state's clergy-com-
municant privilege. 14
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and re-
manded the case for a new trial. 15 The court of appeals stated that the aunt
"initiated the visits to the defendant" and that she "approached him both as a
close relative and as a minister."1 6 The court then held it was "impossible to
determine to what extent the defendant confided in [the aunt] as a relative and to
what extent as a minister."1 7 Thus, the court determined the entire communica-
8. 77 N.C. App. 832, 336 S.E.2d 437 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 199, 341 S.E.2d 572
(1986).
9. Id. at 832, 336 S.E.2d at 438.
10. Id. at 833, 336 S.E.2d at 438.
11. Id. at 833-34, 336 S.E.2d 438.
12. Id. at 833, 336 S.E.2d at 438.
13. Id. at 833-34, 336 S.E.2d at 438.
14. Id. at 833, 336 S.E.2d at 438.
15. Id. at 834, 336 S.E.2d at 438.
16. Id. at 833, 336 S.E.2d at 438.
17. Id. at 834, 336 S.E.2d at 438.
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tion was privileged, and the trial court erred in admitting the aunt's testimony
regarding what defendant told her during her visits to the jail.18
In State v. Barber 19 the North Carolina Supreme Court examined a conver-
sation between defendant and a close friend to determine whether the friend was
a minister acting in a professional capacity, and whether defendant was seeking
spiritual counseling at the time of the conversation. In Barber defendant was
charged with two counts of first degree rape involving his five-year old adopted
daughter. 20 Included in the testimony at trial was that of defendant's neighbor,
Michael Barrier.2l Defendant objected to Barrier's testimony on the grounds
that Barrier was an ordained minister and any communication between Barrier
and defendant was protected by the clergy-communicant privilege.22 The trial
court, after a voir dire hearing on the matter, ruled that Barrier was neither an
ordained nor a licensed minister and, therefore, the privilege did not apply.23
Barrier then testified that defendant told him about an incident in which defend-
ant had sexual intercourse with his adopted daughter.24
Defendant appealed based on three assignments of error, including the trial
court's refusal to exclude Barrier's testimony. 25 The supreme court held the
clergy-communicant privilege inapplicable for two reasons. First, Barrier was
not an ordained minister or clergyman at the time defendant confessed the inci-
dent to him.26 Second, the court found that Barrier and defendant had been
friends for some time and that the nature of their conversation indicated that
defendant approached Barrier not seeking spiritual guidance but solely as a
friend.27 Therefore, the court held the privilege inapplicable, because the com-
munication was not entrusted to Barrier in any professional capacity as a minis-
ter and because defendant was not seeking spiritual guidance at the time he
made the communication. 28
In State v. West 29 the supreme court interpreted the meaning of "seeking
spiritual counsel and advice" 30 within the meaning of the privilege statute, and
also determined whether the presence of a third party during the communication
destroyed the confidentiality requirement of the privilege. Defendant in West
18. Id.
19. 317 N.C. 502, 346 S.E.2d 441 (1986).
20. Id. at 503, 346 S.E.2d at 442.
21. Id. at 507, 346 S.E.2d at 444-45.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 507-08, 346 S.E.2d at 444-45.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 503, 346 S.E.2d at 442. Because defendant received a life sentence he appealed di-
rectly to the supreme court pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a) (1986). Id. at 502, 346 S.E.2d
at 442. Defendant also claimed the trial court erred in not allowing him to cross-examine the six-
year old victim concerning her testimony given during a competency voir dire. Id. at 503, 346 S.E.2d
at 442. In addition, defendant claimed the trial court erroneously permitted the prosecutor to com-
ment on defendant's failure to testify. Id. The supreme court found all three assignments of error
meritless. Id.
26. Id. at 509, 346 S.E.2d at 445.
27. Id. at 509, 346 S.E.2d at 446.
28. Id.
29. 317 N.C. 219, 345 S.E.2d 186 (1986).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986).
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was accused of first-degree rape and first-degree sexual offense. 31 The victim
was defendant's fourteen-year old stepdaughter who, according to her testi-
mony, had been subjected to several sexual attacks by defendant over a period of
at least three years.32 During the last attempted attack, the victim escaped
through her bedroom window and ran to a neighbor's house.33 After the victim
told the neighbor about the previous attacks, the neighbor drove her to the par-
sonage of defendant's family church. The victim then told her family's minister,
Reverend Black, and his wife what had happened. 34
Later, after meeting with both the victim and her mother, the minister and
his wife met with defendant at the parsonage.35 According to Black's testimony,
defendant "elaborated on his sexual desires, telling the preacher that he had had
intercourse with [the victim] from when she was around nine years old, that he
would just go into a 'rage' and that he had bought pornographic literature and
women's underwear."' 36 Following his conviction, defendant appealed claiming
the conversation with Reverend Black and his wife was privileged and the trial
court erred in admitting Reverend Black's testimony. 37
The supreme court rejected defendant's claim on two grounds. First, be-
cause the minister's wife was present during the conversation, defendant had no
reason to expect the communication was confidential. 38 The court interpreted
the requirement of North Carolina General Statutes section 8-53.2 that the com-
munication be "entrusted" to the minister to mean that the communication
must be one intended to be confidential. Therefore, the court held that confiden-
tiality was destroyed by the presence of the minister's wife. 39 Second, the court
referred to the minister's testimony indicating that he had told defendant's wife
that defendant " 'needed help' and that he 'was going to try to help him.' "40
These words, the court stated, indicated that the minister sought out defendant
for the purpose of rendering spiritual advice and counsel, not that defendant
sought advice and counsel. 41 The court concluded the requirement that the
communicant be seeking spiritual advice and counsel was not met; thus, the
privilege did not apply.42
In all three of these cases the courts defined the scope of the clergy-commu-
nicant privilege by examining the language of section 8-53.2 and applying the
elements of the privilege described' therein. The clergy-communicant privilege
31. West, 317 N.C. at 221, 345 S.E.2d at 188.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 222, 345 S.E.2d at 188.
36. Id.
37. Id. Defendant appealed directly to the supreme court from a life sentence. Id. at 220, 345
S.E.2d at 187-88. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a) (1986) (providing for appeal as of right from
judgments of life imprisonment).
38. West, 317 N.C. at 222-23, 345 S.E.2d at 188-89.
39. Id. at 223, 345 S.E.2d at 189.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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in North Carolina, as in most other states, is a creature of statute and was not
recognized as a part of American common law.43 Although legal scholars disa-
gree about whether English common law originally recognized the privilege,
communications between clergy and parishioners apparently were not consid-
ered strictly confidential, at least following the time of Henry VIII.44 Today,
however, at least forty-nine states recognize some form of the privilege by stat-
ute.$5 Although the exact wording of these statutes varies from state to state,
most of them share common elements.46
Numerous public policy considerations justify the existence of the privi-
lege.47 Clergy benefit from the privilege because they can feel free to hear the
problems of communicants and impart advice knowing that both are protected
and that disclosure will not be compelled in court.48 In addition, many clergy
consider the confidentiality of such communications of greater importance than
compliance with court-ordered disclosure. As a result, some clergy faced with
this difficult choice will go to jail rather than divulge the contents of a confiden-
tial communication with a parishioner.49 Communicants benefit from the privi-
lege because they can feel free to seek spiritual counsel and comfort without fear
that their words may be used to convict them or to injure their interests at a
43. See In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 76, 152 S.E.2d 317, 324, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918 (1967).
44. J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2394, at 869-70. Professor Wigmore indicated that following
the Restoration, the English practice was to deny the privilege. Id. He also pointed out, however,
that a few English judges stated they would not compel disclosure from a member of the clergy. Id.
(citing Attorney-General v. Briant, 15 LJ.-Ex. (n.s.) 265, 271 (1846); Broad v. Pitt, 3 Car. & P. 518,
519, 172 Eng. Rep. 528-29 (C.P. 1828)).
45. See . WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2395, at 873 n.1 & 1986 Supp. at 197-98 n.1 (listing states
that recognize the privilege); Smith, The Pastor on the Witness Stand: Toward a Religious Privilege
in the Courts, 29 CATH. LAW. 1, 19-21 (1984) (listing the states that recognize the privilege and
comparing their statutes).
46. For example, most of the statutes require the communication to be made to a clergyman,
priest, rabbi, or religious practitioner of an established church. See, eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-
1001, Rule 505 (1979 & Supp. 1983) ("clergyman is a minister, priest, rabbi, or accredited Christian
Science Practitioner"); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1031 (West 1966 & Supp. 1987) ("clergyman, priest,
minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church"). The communication must be
made to the minister in his or her professional capacity. See, eg., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-
107(c) (1973 & Supp. 1986) ("professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the
church to which he belongs"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505(2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1986) ("in his
capacity as spiritual advisor"). Several of the statutes also include communications made by persons
seeking spiritual guidance and do not limit the privilege to confessions only. See, eg., GA. CODE.
ANN. § 24-9-22 (1982 & Supp. 1986) ("seeking spiritual comfort or seeking counseling"); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13:3734.1 (West Supp. 1987) ("seeking spiritual advice or consolation").
47. For a discussion of the various policy objectives behind the clergy-communicant privilege
as well as the history of the privilege in England and the United States, see Yellin, The History and
Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 95, 95-114 (1983). Yellin
indicated a major consideration is that, without the privilege, some clergy would "rather risk the
punitive powers of the courts than disregard basic religious doctrines." Id. at 110. However, Yellin
questioned the validity of this argument because many state statutes allow the communicant to
waive the privilege. Id. at 111 n.76. North Carolina is one of the states that allow the communicant
to waive the privilege. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986). Whether the North Carolina privilege
protects a minister who refuses to testify was a major point of contention in In re Williams, 269 N.C.
68, 152 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918 (1967), in which the minister was jailed for contempt
after refusing to testify.
48. See Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 Osno ST. L.. 55, 60 (1963).
49. Id. at 81.
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later date.5 0 As one writer explained, "[s]ince the confidential communications
may give relief from tensions and anxieties, is not the psychological therapeutic
value to the individual, and thus to the body politic, significant enough that we
should protect the relationship that accomplishes that result?"-"
The privilege also allows the church as an institution to protect those com-
munications it deems necessary or beneficial for the guidance and counseling of
its members.5 2 In fact, the legal system's respect for the clergy and for estab-
lished religion may itself be a source of justification for the privilege.5 3 Finally,
because trial courts are placed in an uncomfortable position when they seek to
compel the testimony of a minister who insists on preserving confidentiality, the
judicial system benefits from the privilege.54 Because the testimony of a minister
regarding communications with a parishioner should generally be reliable and
otherwise admissible, the privilege represents a balancing of these public policy
interests against the importance of hearing all available testimony to determine
truth at trial. Any determination of whether to apply the privilege should take
into consideration these policy objectives and determine whether applying or
refusing to apply the privilege will further the objectives established by a state's
legislature.
North Carolina's first clergy-communicant privilege statute, enacted in
1959, applied to communications that were "confidentially communicated" to a
"clergyman, ordained minister, priest or rabbi of an established church or reli-
gious organization... in his professional capacity under such circumstances
that to disclose the information would violate a sacred or moral trust." 55 The
original version also permitted a presiding judge to waive the privilege and com-
pel disclosure if the testimony was necessary "to a proper administration of jus-
tice."15 6 The statute was amended in 1963 to include "accredited Christian
Science Practitioner[s]" among those to whom privileged communications might
50. Id.
51. Id. at 81-82.
52. Id. at 60.
53. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1450, 1558
(1985) [hereinafter Developments].
54. See Reese, supra note 48, at 60. Professor Wigmore argued that the reasons behind recog-
nizing the clergy-communicant privilege are the same as those for recognizing other privileges. Jus-
tification exists for a privilege if. (1) the communication originates in confidence or secrecy; (2) the
communication is essential to the relation; (3) the relation involved deserves recognition and counte-
nance; and (4) the benefits of having the privilege are greater than the damage done to justice by not
compelling disclosure. J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2396, at 878. Wigmore also noted that Jeremy
Bentham, "the greatest opponent of privileges," felt the clergy-communicant privilege, or at least a
privilege recognizing the secrecy of Catholic confessions, should be recognized. Id. (citing 4 J. BEN-
THAm, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 588-91 (1st ed. 1827)).
55. Act of May 28, 1959, ch. 646, § 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 537, 537 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986)). The 1959 version stated:
No clergyman, ordained minister, priest or rabbi of an established church or religious or-
ganization shall be required to testify in any action, suit or proceeding, concerning any
information which may have been confidentially communicated to him in his professional
capacity under such circumstances that to disclose the information would violate a sacred
or moral trust, when the giving of such testimony is objected to by the communicant;
provided, that the presiding judge in any trial may compel such disclosure if in his opinion
the same is necessary to a proper administration of justice.
56. Id.
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be made.5 7
The current version of the privilege, rewritten in 1967,58 does not include
the word "confidential" and contains no language permitting the trial judge to
compel disclosure for a proper administration of justice.5 9 The current version
contains several requirements that must be met for a communication to be inad-
missible at trial. First, the communication must be made to a "priest, rabbi,
accredited Christian Science practitioner, or a clergyman or ordained minister of
an established church."' 6 The statute does not specify what constitutes an es-
tablished church, but at least one writer has suggested the term may indicate "an
incorporated body."' 61 Second, the information must be communicated to the
minister in his or her professional capacity. 62 This requirement is common
among statutes in other states and generally prevents the privilege from applying
to communications made to a minister in any capacity other than confessor or
spiritual counselor. 63 However, the professional capacity of ministers has ex-
panded in recent years to include marriage counseling," and at least one case
has held it to include counseling persons concerning selective service
57. Act of April 11, 1963, ch. 200, § 1, 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws 293, 293 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986)).
58. Act of June 15, 1967, ch. 794, § 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1003, 1003-04 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986)).
59. For the full text of the current statute, see supra text accompanying note 6.
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986).
61. Reese, supra note 48, at 65. In Barber the supreme court specifically stated its decision was
"not based on a determination that the Christian Ministry of Tennessee from which Barrier received
a license for a ten dollar fee is not an established church within the meaning of the statute." Barber,
317 N.C. at 508, 346 S.E.2d at 445. An earlier case cited by the court in Barber involved a defendant
who was charged with bigamy. State v. Lynch, 301 N.C. 479, 272 S.E.2d 349 (1980). In Lynch
defendant's first marriage was performed by one Chester Wilson, who had obtained the "credentials
of a minister" by sending "his name, address and ten dollars to the California Headquarters" of the
Universal Life Church, Inc. Id. at 480-81, 272 S.E.2d at 350. The court held that defendant had not
violated the state's bigamy laws because his first marriage was not legally recognized. Because the
first marriage had not been solemnized by a person recognized as performing marriage ceremonies
within the meaning of North Carolina General Statutes section 5 1-1, defendant was not legally mar-
ried when he remarried and thus could not be convicted of bigamy. Id. at 487-89, 272 S.E.2d at 354-
55; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1 (1985) (indentifying individuals who may perform the marriage
ceremony in North Carolina). The court then went on to state: "It is not within the power of the
State to declare what is or is not a religious body or who is or is not a religious leader within the
body .... Our concern is whether the marriage is one the State recognizes." Lynch, 301 N.C. at
488, 272 S.E.2d at 354. In the following year, the general assembly recognized by statute "marriages
performed by ministers of the Universal Life Church" prior to July 3, 1981. Act of July 3, 1981, ch.
797, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1169, 1169 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.1 (1984)).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986).
63. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 557, 560-61, 221 S.W.2d 87, 89 (1949) (refus-
ing to apply the privilege to a conversation between defendant and a minister in which the communi-
cation was made "in the same manner it would have been made to any other visitor"); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 13-90-107(c) (1973 & Supp. 1986) (communication must be made to clergy acting in "pro-
fessional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs") see also
Annotation, Matters to Which the Privilege Covering Communications to Clergymen or Spiritual Ad-
viser Extends, 71 A.L.R.3D 794, 806-07 (1976 & Supp. 1986) (listing cases from numerous jurisdic-
tions requiring that the communication be made to a minister acting in a professional character).
64. See Spencer v. Spencer, 61 N.C. App. 535, 301 S.E.2d 411, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 678,
304 S.E.2d 757 (1983). In Spencer the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied the clergy-commu-
nicant privilege to a marriage counseling session involving the husband, wife, and minister, stating
the information was communicated to the minister in his professional capacity. Id. at 539, 301
S.E.2d at 413.
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Third, the communication must be one that is "necessary to enable [the
minister] to discharge the functions of his office according to the usual course of
his practice or discipline."' 66 Although many courts have interpreted similar
language to require the communication to be penitential in character, 67 the priv-
ilege has expanded to cover numerous types of communications that are consid-
ered necessary for a minister to fulfill the obligations of his or her office. 68
Last, the person making the communication must be "seeking spiritual
counsel and advice relative to and growing out of the information so im-
parted."' 69 This element represents a more liberalized version of the privilege
than that recognized in many of the older state statutes.70 In some cases courts
have recognized the privilege only where a confession or other communication
was a required part of the church doctrine.7 1 However, the more liberal lan-
guage of section 8-53.2 expands the types of privileged information included to
cover almost any communication between a clergyperson and a communicant as
long as the communicant is seeking spiritual counsel or advice.7 2
The North Carolina privilege does not apply if the communicant waives the
privilege in open court. 73 This additional provision, added in 1967, 74 actually
expanded the application of the privilege. Under the pre-1967 version, the com-
municant had to object to admission of testimony concerning the conversation
before the privilege was deemed to apply. 75 However, a minister is now incom-
65. In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435-36 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986).
67. See, eg., People v. Johnson, 270 Cal. App. 2d 204, 207-08, 75 Cal. Rptr. 605, 607 (1969)
(holding that requirements for a "privileged 'penitential communication' " were not met); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 557, 560-61, 221 S.W.2d 87, 89 (1949) (communication must be penitential
in character and " 'in connection with or in discharge of... [a] religious duty or obligation' ")
(quoting 58 AM. JUR. Witnesses § 532 (1948)). For a list of cases holding that the communication
must be "penitential in character," see Annotation, supra note 63, at 807-08.
68. One writer concluded that under the current North Carolina statutes "[a]ny information
communicated and entrusted to [a minister] in his professional capacity and necessary for him to
discharge his official function is to be regarded as incompetent testimony." Note, Evidence-Privi-
leged Communications-The New North Carolina Priest-Penitent Statute, 46 N.C.L. REV. 427, 430
(1968).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986).
70. "Thus it appears that the intent of the General Assembly was not to limit the communica-
tion to a confession of sins alone." Note, supra note 68, at 430. The language of the North Carolina
statute, like that found in Minnesota's clergy-communicant privilege, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02
(West Supp. 1987), contains liberal wording and should include any information given to a minister
while the communicant was seeking spiritual guidance. See Reese, supra note 48, at 62-64.
71. See, eg., Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201, 203-04 (1881) (noting that communications must be
"penitential in their character, or as are made to clergymen in obedience to some supposed religious
duty or obligation"); Colbert v. State, 125 Wis. 423, 431-32, 104 N.W. 61, 65 (1905) (holding a letter
to a priest was not privileged because "there was no confession, and further because... [the priest]
was not acting in his professional character at the time"). Contra In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602,
603-04, 237 N.W. 589, 590 (1931) (holding the Minnesota statute could not be limited to confessions
because to do so would mean the privilege only applied to priests of the Roman Catholic Church).
72. See Reese, supra note 48, at 62-63; Note, supra note 68, at 430.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986).
74. Act of June 15, 1967, ch. 794, § 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1003, 1003-04 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986)).
75. See In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 77, 152 S.E.2d 317, 324, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918 (1967);
Note, supra note 68, at 428.
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petent to testify about such communications unless the communicant waives the
privilege.7
6
The North Carolina Supreme Court and the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals applied these elements in deciding three cases in 1985 and 1986. 77 Prior to
these cases, the North Carolina appellate courts had addressed the privilege only
twice. In neither of these earlier cases, however, was the court faced with the
exact issues raised in this latest trilogy.78 In Barber the supreme court inter-
preted the requirements that the communication be made to a minister acting in
his or her professional capacity and that the communicant be seeking spiritual
counsel.7 9 In Jackson the court of appeals applied the requirement that the
communication be made to a minister acting in a professional capacity to a fac-
tual situation in which the conversation was mixed with both spiritual counsel-
ing and a discussion of family matters in a noncounseling context.80 In West the
supreme court examined, from a different perspective, the requirement that the
communicant be seeking spiritual counseling, and also determined that the pres-
ence of a third party during the communication destroys its confidentiality and
the privilege along with it.81
In order for the clergy-communicant privilege to apply, the Barber court
required that communications be made to a minister acting in his professional
capacity and that the communicant be seeking spiritual aid. Both requirements
are common to privilege statutes in other jurisdictions, and numerous state ap-
pellate courts have applied such requirements to specific fact situations.8 2 In
Barber the supreme court agreed with the trial court that the witness, Barrier,
was not an ordained or licensed minister at the time the communication took
place.8 3 In addition, because Barrier was approached by defendant as a friend
76. See Note, supra note 68, at 428.
77. State v. Barber, 317 N.C. 502, 346 S.E.2d 441 (1986); State v. West, 317 N.C. 219, 345
S.E.2d 186 (1986); State v. Jackson, 77 N.C. App. 832, 336 S.E.2d 437 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 316
N.C. 199, 341 S.E.2d 572 (1986). See supra notes 8-42 and accompanying text.
78. In In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918 (1967), the
supreme court refused to apply the privilege to a communication between a minister, Williams, and
defendant. The court avoided the substantive issues surrounding application of the privilege by
holding the minister was compelled to testify and the privilege did not apply because the communi-
cant failed to object to the admission of the testimony. Id. at 77, 152 S.E.2d at 324. Shortly after the
court decided Williams, the general assembly rewrote § 8-53.2 to require the communicant to waive
the privilege in open court before it could be deemed waived. Act of June 15, 1967, ch. 794, § 1,
1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1003, 1004 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986)); see Note, supra note
68, at 431.
In Spencer v. Spencer, 61 N.C. App. 535, 539, 301 S.E.2d 411, 413, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C.
678, 304 S.E.2d 757 (1983), the court of appeals held that communications made by a husband to a
minister during marriage counseling were privileged.
79. Although these requirements are distinct, the factual circumstances that determine whether
the privilege applies often are interdependent. Therefore, they are discussed together within the
context of Barber.
80. Jackson, 77 N.C. App. at 833-34, 336 S.E.2d at 438.
81. West, 317 N.C. at 222-23, 345 S.E.2d at 188-89.
82. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
83. Barber, 317 N.C. at 509, 346 S.E.2d at 445. When Barrier was asked if he was an ordained
minister, he replied:
No, I am not ordained. I can explain this. I am a licensed exhorter by the Church of God.
At the time that Grant [defendant] came and talked to me I had no licenses of any kind
1398 [Vol. 65
and not as a minister, the court held defendant was not seeking advice and coun-
sel within the meaning of the statute.8 4 The court reached this conclusion be-
cause the two men had been friends for a number of years and because it found
the nature of their conversation indicated that defendant was not seeking spiri-
tual counseling when he told Barrier about the incident with his daughter.8 5
The court compared the fact situation in Barber to that in Burger v. State,8 6 in
which the Georgia Supreme Court refused to apply the Georgia clergy-commu-
nicant privilege,8 7 because the "minister-witness had been the defendant's friend
and frequent companion."8 8 In Burger the Georgia court, like the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court in Barber, concluded the communications were "conversa-
tional statements to a friend" and were not made for the purpose of seeking
spiritual guidance.8 9
The court reached a logical conclusion in refusing to apply the privilege in
Barber, but the opinion is confusing. The witness, Barrier, was not an ordained
minister, but had been a "licensed exhorter" having received his license from the
Christian Ministry of Tennessee in exchange for a ten dollar fee. 90 However,
there appears to have been no evidence indicating defendant had relied on the
witness holding any particular position in his church when defendant made the
communication.91 The two men had attended church together, but were not
members of the same church.92 Furthermore, as the court pointed out in its
opinion, defendant requested that Barrier not tell anyone of their conversation
"to avoid hurting the victim." 93 Such circumstances suggest defendant was not
with any organization. I had been licensed with the Christian Ministry out of Tennessee
and they [sic] had expired at the time. My license was invalid at the time I talked to him. I
was still conducting services at times but as far as to say ordianed [sic] minister I was not
because [sic] to be such I had to have the hands of an ordianed [sic] minister laid upon me
and I had not.
Id. at 508, 346 S.E.2d at 445.
84. Id. at 509-510, 346 S.E.2d at 445-46.
85. Id.
86. 238 Ga. 171, 231 S.E.2d 769 (1977).
87. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
88. Barber, 317 N.C. at 508, 346 S.E.2d at 446. In Burger defendant was tried and convicted of
murdering his wife and her lover after catching the two in a "compromising setting." Burger, 238
Ga. at 171, 231 S.E.2d at 770. After dismissing defendant's claim that the killing was justifiable in
order to prevent adultery, id. at 171, 231 S.E.2d at 770-71, the court turned its attention to the
testimony of Reverend Spurling, a witness for the State. The court held that because defendant's
statements were conversational ones made to a close friend and companion and because Spurling
testified that the communication was not made by defendant in" 'professing religious faith, or seek-
ing spiritual comfort' or 'guidance,'" the privilege did not apply. Id. at 172, 231 S.E.2d at 771
(quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (1981).
89. Barber, 317 N.C. at 509-10, 346 S.E.2d at 446; accord Burger, 238 Ga. at 172, 231 S.E.2d at
771.
90. Barber, 317 N.C. at 508, 346 S.E.2d at 445. The court stated its decision was not based on
whether the Christian Ministry of Tennessee is an established church within the meaning of section
8-53.2. Id. at 508, 346 S.E.2d at 445. For a discussion on this point, see supra note 61.
91. Barrier testified that he knew defendant as a "[fiellow employee and he knew I was con-
ducting services and spreading the word but as far as being ordianed [sic], I did not have any such
license at that time." Barber, 317 N.C. at 508, 346 S.E.2d at 445.
92. Id. at 507, 346 S.E.2d at 445.
93. Id. at 510, 346 S.E.2d at 446.
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seeking spiritual counsel or advice within the meaning of the statute.94
However, the court placed too much emphasis on the fact defendant and
Barrier were long-time friends. The court seemed to indicate their long-term
friendship was enough to destroy the privilege, even if Barrier was an ordained
minister of an established church.95 The court probably inferred, however, that
the long-term friendship supported its conclusion that the communication was
strictly that of two friends and that no element of clergy counseling was present
in the conversation. Such a conclusion could follow from the facts as presented,
because defendant probably knew Barrier was not an ordained minister. How-
ever, had Barrier been an ordained minister of an established church when de-
fendant spoke to him, and had defendant in fact approached Barrier seeking
spiritual counseling, then the preexisting friendship and the fact not all of their
conversation resulted from defendant's need for spiritual advice should not have
destroyed the privilege. 96
An excellent case in point is Jackson, in which the court of appeals applied
the privilege to exclude testimony about a conversation between the defendant
and his minister-aunt. In Jackson the court of appeals determined that an ad-
mission of guilt made to the aunt in defendant's jail cell was privileged, even
though part of their conversation did not involve defendant's seeking spiritual
counseling or advice.97 The admission of guilt came after the two talked and
prayed for some time and after the minister-aunt offered comfort to defendant. 98
The court held that the part of the conversation relating only to communications
with a close relative and the part relating to a clergy-communicant relationship
were inseparable; thus, the entire conversation was privileged. 99
Taken together, Barber and Jackson appear to stand for consistent ideas
regarding the nature of the privilege. Once the court's meaning is derived from
a between-the-lines reading of Barber, it appears that whenever a communica-
tion is made solely for a purpose not covered by the privilege statute, the privi-
lege does not apply, and the minister is permitted to testify about the
conversation. As the Jackson court noted, however, when other communica-
tions are intertwined in a conversation legitimately considered privileged-as in
cases in which the communicant is at least in part seeking spiritual counsel or
advice-then the entire communication must be regarded as privileged. This
94. "The evidence clearly establishes that the only purpose of the defendant's visit was to con-
fide in a friend." Id. at 510, 346 S.E.2d at 446.
95. See id.
96. To hold that a preexisting friendship destroyed the privilege would lead to a difficult and
absurd result, because this would mean a minister could only offer advice and counsel to persons
who were not friends. If applied to other privileges, such a holding would mean that communica-
tions between a doctor and patient who were friends would not be privileged. Likewise, even law
partners who consulted each other on personal legal matters would lack the protection of confidenti-
ality unless they constantly attacked each other. Perhaps, however, the defendant in Barber would
have done well to heed the advice of Benjamin Franklin: "If you would keep your secret from an
enemy, tell it not to a friend." B. FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALMANACK (1741), reprinted in F.
BARBOUR, A CONCORDANCE TO THE SAYINGS IN FRANKLIN'S POOR RICHARD 189 (1974).
97. Jackson, 77 N.C. App. at 833-34, 336 S.E.2d at 438.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 834, 336 S.E.2d at 438.
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conclusion is demonstrated by the manner in which the supreme court distin-
guished Barber from Jackson. The court pointed out that the minister-aunt of-
fered comfort and spiritual advice to defendant in Jackson, but stated that the
conversation in Barber, like the conversation at issue in the Georgia Burger
case, lacked this necessary element. 10°
Another issue raised by Jackson was whether defendant was seeking spiri-
tual counsel within the meaning of section 8-53.2 because the minister-aunt vis-
ited defendant instead of defendant approaching her. The State argued the
privilege did not apply, because defendant made no request for spiritual counsel-
ing and the minister-aunt visited him to "satisfy her own needs." 10 1 Although
not directly addressing the State's argument, the court of appeals stated that the
aunt "initiated the visits to defendant while he was in jail.. . and that she sought
to comfort him."10 2 The court of appeals apparently saw no distinction between
a minister seeking out a communicant to give advice and a communicant seeking
advice from a minister. The supreme court took a different view in West.
The West court refused to apply the clergy-communicant privilege, first,
100. Barber, 317 N.C. at 509-10, 346 S.E.2d at 446. Although the court compared Barber to the
facts of Burger, see supra note 88, the Georgia court's opinion in Burger gives little information
about the exact nature of the conversation and relies on the testimony of the minister that defendant
was not seeking spiritual advice. Burger, 238 Ga. at 172, 231 S.E.2d at 771. However, the holdings
in both Barber and Burger are consistent with cases from other jurisdictions that have held commu-
nications made to a minister acting only as a friend and not in a professional capacity are not privi-
leged. See, eg., Wainscott v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 628, 632-633 (Ky.) (communication
made to minister acting as a friend not privileged), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978); see supra note
63.
Another issue raised by the State's brief in Jackson, but not discussed by the court of appeals,
was whether the privilege applies when the communication is intended for a third party. Brief for
the State at 2-3, Jackson (No. 8520SC371). In Jackson the minister-aunt testified that defendant told
her at the close of their conversation "to tell my mama [defendant's grandmother] he was sorry he
caused all the trouble in the family and everything." Record on Appeal at 10-11, Jackson. The state
argued that because defendant intended for the communication to be passed on to a third party, the
privilege did not apply. Brief for the State at 2-3, Jackson. This argument has great support in other
jurisdictions; in nearly all cases in which the communicant has requested that the information be
passed on to third parties, the privilege was held inapplicable. See, eg., United States v. Wells, 446
F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1971) (defendant, in a letter to a priest, asked the priest to contact an F.B.I. agent);
Mitsunga v. People, 54 Colo. 102, 129 P. 241 (1913) (privilege inapplicable when defendant used
minister to transmit a message to the chief of police); Hills v. State, 61 Neb. 589, 85 N.W. 836 (1901)
(privilege inapplicable when defendant asked minister to take message to his wife). An interesting
case on this point is Naum v. State, 630 P.2d 785 (Okla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1058 (1981), in
which the court held defendant's confession to a minister was not privileged because defendant asked
the minister to call an attorney for him. The court, in a touch of twisted logic, held the attorney-
client privilege could not protect the confidentiality of the conversation because the minister was not
an agent of the attorney, and therefore neither privilege applied. Id. at 787-88.
Although not addressed by the court, this exception to the privilege should not apply to the
facts of Jackson. First, defendant merely requested the witness to tell his grandmother that he was
sorry for causing trouble for his family. Record on Appeal at 10-11, Jackson. He did not ask that
she pass along his admission of guilt. Id. Arguably, an innocent person could be quite sorry for
causing his family trouble simply because he had been arrested. Second, the request came at the end
of their conversation, id., and although the court correctly held that the part of the communication
made to the witness as a family member and that part made to her as a minister were inseparable, the
information to be passed on came after the spiritual counseling had taken place at the end of the
aunt's visit. Even if the State had successfully argued that the request to apologize to the grand-
mother was an admissible part of the testimony, this part said very little about defendant's guilt, and
in any event, it should not have destroyed the privilege applicable to the rest of the conversation.
101. Brief for the State at 2, Jackson.
102. Jackson, 77 N.C. App. at 833, 336 S.E.2d at 438.
1987]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
because the minister initiated the conversation with defendant and sought him
out.10 3 The court pointed to the language of the statute that requires the com-
municant to be "seeking the counsel and advice of his minister." 1° 4 Second, the
court then noted the minister had told defendant's wife that "defendant
'need[ed] help' and that he 'was going to try to help him,' "and that the minister
"had sought out defendant for that purpose."10 5 Thus, the court concluded that
because the minister had sought out defendant, the element of the privilege re-
quiring the communicant to be seeking spiritual advice and counsel was missing
and, therefore, the privilege did not apply.106
The supreme court declined to review the court of appeals' decision in Jack-
son 10 7 and seemed to approve it in a case decided after the West decision.10 8
Nevertheless, the court's reasoning in West clearly contradicted the court of ap-
peals' holding in Jackson. In Jackson the court of appeals acknowledged that
the minister-aunt initiated the conversation and the visits to the jail.10 9 Because
defendant in Jackson was in jail when the conversation took place, he was argua-
bly incapable of doing a great deal of seeking of any kind. However, this does
not dismiss the fact the minister in Jackson appeared at the jail without a request
from defendant. The facts in Jackson clearly indicate, in the words of the court
of appeals, "that [the minister-aunt] sought to comfort him." 11°
Despite the result in Jackson, the supreme court in West held the privilege
inapplicable because the minister sought to help defendant."' The distinction
created by the court in West, between situations in which a minister seeks out a
communicant and those in which a communicant seeks out a minister, is not
only inconsistent with Jackson, it is superficial and meaningless. First, as the
supreme court noted in West, the conversation "appeared to be one in which the
preacher was offering his advice and counsel."11 2 Thus, the question raised in
Barber over the actual purpose of the conversation-comfort from a friend or
spiritual guidance by a minister-did not arise in West. Second, a distinction
based on whether the minister sought out the communicant or vice-versa is a
corruption of the statutory language and finds little if any support from the deci-
sions of courts in other jurisdictions or from the language of other common-law
and statutory privileges. 113 The attorney-client privilege, for example, is
103. West, 317 N.C. at 223, 345 S.E.2d at 189.
104. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 6.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. State v. Jackson, 316 N.C. 199, 341 S.E.2d 572 (1986), denying disc. rev. to 77 N.C. App.
832, 336 S.E.2d 437 (1985).
108. In Barber the supreme court rejected defendant's claim that Jackson compelled the court to
find the communication between defendant and Barrier was privileged. Barber, 317 N.C. at 509-10,
346 S.E.2d at 446. In so doing, the court distinguished the facts of Barber from those of Jackson and
seemed to approve the Jackson court's holding based on the particular facts of that case. Id.
109. Jackson, 77 N.C. App. at 833, 336 S.E.2d at 438.
110. Id.
11. West, 317 N.C. at 223, 345 S.E.2d at 189.
112. Id,
113. North Carolina recognizes numerous privileges by statute, including communications be-
tween: physician and patient, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1986) (information which may have been
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designed to encourage individuals needing counsel or assistance to communicate
with an attorney without fear of having their conversations revealed in court.
114
By recognizing the privilege, courts and state legislatures have determined that
the advantages of encouraging individuals to seek legal assistance outweigh the
disadvantages of not allowing attorneys to testify against their clients. One can
only imagine the howl that would rise from state bar associations if courts began
to apply the attorney-client privilege based on whether the client sought out the
attorney. 11
5
Last, the distinction made by the court in West may injure the underlying
policy objectives behind the privilege. 116 Churches that zealously encourage
members to discuss their problems with clergypersons in order to gain helpful
advice and spiritual counseling may now find their efforts thwarted by the
court's new rule against a minister seeking out communicants. Furthermore, if
the public policy promoted by the privilege includes encouraging individuals to
seek spiritual guidance when they are troubled, how can the same public policy
be defeated when a minister personally encourages the communicant to open up
and allow the minister to offer help and guidance? Following the West decision,
ministers seeking to rely on the privilege may become reluctant to seek out or
even send for a church member who may be in need of help. If the minister and
his or her church consider confidentiality essential to proper performance of
their duties, then under the rule in West the minister must either sit idly hoping
the church member will appear seeking help, or run the risk of being forced to
disclose his communications for having taken the initiative to help a follower in
trouble. Although this may not have been the intent of the court, this will cer-
tainly be the practical effect if ministers and the public follow the law as pre-
scribed by the court in West.
The supreme court's second reason for refusing to apply the clergy-commu-
nicant privilege in West was that confidentiality was destroyed by the presence of
Reverend Black's wife during the conversation with defendant. The court took
notice that the word "confidential," which was an element of the privilege found
acquired in attending to a patient in a professional character); psychologist and client, id. § 8-53.3
(information which may have been acquired in rendering professional psychological services); school
counselors and students, id. § 8-53.4 (information which may have been acquired in rendering coun-
seling services to any student enrolled in public school system or private school). In addition, North
Carolina recognizes a common-law attorney-client privilege. Dobias v. White, 240 N.C. 680, 684, 83
S.E.2d 785, 788 (1954). The wording of these privileges makes no distinction regarding the applica-
tion of the privilege based on who seeks out whom.
114. See United States v. United States Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).
115. Several circumstances may arise in which an attorney may approach a client, and the con-
versation would be covered by the attorney-client privilege. For example, if the attorney and client
have an ongoing relationship, the attorney may approach the client to get needed information. The
supreme court in West never addressed whether a preexisting relationship between a clergyperson
and a communicant added strength to defendant's argument that the privilege applied. Although
the clergy-communicant privilege should apply regardless of whether the communicant is a member
of the minister's church, see Reese, supra note 48, at 83, the existence of an established relationship
between the clergyperson and the communicant certainly strengthens the argument that the commu-
nicant was seeking spiritual counseling at the time the communication was made. In West defendant
and his family were members of the minister's church when the communication took place. West,
317 N.C. at 221, 345 S.E.2d at 188.
116. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
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in the pre-1967 version of the statute, had been removed by the 1967 general
assembly. 117 However, the court stated that this exclusion was "clearly not in-
tended to broaden application of the privilege to all genre of general conversa-
tion with one's spiritual mentor, but merely to broaden the range of advisory
and counseling practices to which it applies."' 118 Thus, the court concluded the
necessity for an expectation of confidentiality was not affected by the change,
and in the absence of such a confidential relationship, a communication is not
privileged. 119 The court then held that because the minister's wife was present
during the conversation with defendant, the communication was not confidential
and the privilege did not apply. 120
Although this second reason for denying the privilege in West rests on
firmer ground than the first, this distinction too is not as solid as would appear
at first glance. The notion that the privilege requires confidentiality and that
confidentiality is destroyed by the presence of a third party has great support
among other jurisdictions and is a rule frequently applied to privileges in gen-
eral.12 ' Traditionally, the clergy-communicant privilege, if it existed at all, ex-
isted only if the communication was confidential. 122 However, because the
general assembly removed the word "confidential" as a requirement for the priv-
ilege to apply, an argument can be made that confidentiality is not an absolute
requirement. 123 On the other hand, the language removed from the statute in
1967 appears to refer to confessions and like communications for which confi-
dentiality is deemed essential to church teachings and for which revelation of
their contents would "violate a sacred or moral trust."'1 2 4
A question the court did not consider in West, however, was whether the
relationship of the third party to the minister and his work makes a difference in
determining if the communication was made in confidence for the purpose of
applying the privilege. For example, in In re Verplank 125 the Federal District
Court for the Central District of California held that nonclergy counselors who
assisted a minister at a college by conducting "draft counseling" were covered
by the privilege. 126 The court held the privilege afforded the counselors the
same protections as the minister, because they engaged in activities that "con-
form 'at least in a general way' with a significant portion of the activities of a
117. West, 317 N.C. at 223, 345 S.E.2d at 189.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Milburn v. Haworth, 47 Colo. 593, 108 P. 155 (1910) (statement made by defend-
ant to minister and four church members held not privileged); State v. Van Landingham, 283 N.C.
589, 602, 197 S.E.2d 539, 547 (1973) (" 'Communications between attorney and client are not privi-
leged where made in the presence of third person, not the agent of either party .......") (quoting 97
C.J.S. Witnesses § 290 (1957)).
122. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2396, at 878.
123. Compare the 1959 version of the privilege, see supra note 55, with the current version. See
supra text accompanying note 6.
124, Act of May 28, 1959, ch. 646, § 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 537, 537 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986)).
125. 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
126. Id. at 436-37.
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minister of an established Protestant denomination, to the extent necessary to
bring them within the privilege covering communications to clergymen." 127
The court went on to compare the relationship between "Rev. Verplank and the
other counselors at the Center [as] closely akin to the relationships between a
lawyer and the nonprofessional representatives that he engages to assist him in
serving his clientele." 128
In Reutkemeier v. Nolte 129 the Iowa Supreme Court held that a confession
made by a fourteen-year old girl in the presence of church elders was privileged
within the meaning of the state's statute. In its opinion, the court took the broad
view of the term "minister" as applying to a larger group of individuals, depend-
ing on the particular church's doctrine. 130 Thus, the court held that the pres-
ence of church elders of a Presbyterian Church during a confession did not
destroy its confidential nature.131
Before holding that the presence of the minister's wife in West destroyed
the privileged nature of the conversation with defendant, perhaps the supreme
court should have looked more carefully at the duties of the wife with regard to
her role in church activities. 132 Not every church can afford to hire several
counselors to assist a minister in counseling church members, and this duty may
on occasion fall, as do many other duties, to the husband or wife of the minister.
If the minister's wife was a completely detached person who never assisted her
husband in affairs of the church, the court's holding in West would be more
readily acceptable. However, such a finding does not appear in the court's opin-
ion in West. In fact, because Mrs. Black was present at the parsonage while
defendant confessed to having committed such atrocious acts, and because the
minister's advice and counseling were administered in her presence, Mrs. Black
appears to have been something more than a detached bystander or a snoopy
relative digging out gossip.
Although the burden of showing that a privilege applies generally falls on
the one who seeks to invoke it, the West court acknowledged that defendant was
seeking spiritual advice. 133 Contrary to appearances at the moment of trial, the
clergy-communicant privilege does not exist to protect defendants from prosecu-
127. Id. at 436 (quoting Proposed Rules of Evidence 51 F.R.D. 315, 372 (1971)).
128. Id. The privilege covering communications between attorneys and their clients has been
extended to third persons who act as agents for the attorney. See, eg., Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga.
691, 177 S.E. 582 (1934) (clerk employed by an attorney is incompetent to testify about confidential
matters communicated in his or her presence); State v. Van Landingham, 283 N.C. 589, 602, 197
S.E.2d 539, 547 (1973) (confidentiality is destroyed if the communication is "made in the presence of
a third person, not the agent of either party") (quoting 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 290 (1957) (emphasis
added)).
129. 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290 (1917).
130. Id. at 346-51, 161 N.W. at 292-93.
131. Id.
132. The court may not have considered this aspect of the privilege because an earlier case estab-
lished that the presence of an attorney's spouse destroyed confidentiality and thus the attorney-client
privilege along with it. See State v. Van Landingham, 283 N.C. 589, 602, 197 S.E.2d 539, 547
(1973). Whether the same rule would apply if the spouse worked in the attorney's law office is less
clear, because the spouse could be considered an agent of the attorney and, therefore, presumably
within the privilege. See id.
133. West, 317 N.C. at 223, 345 S.E.2d at 189.
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tion. Most persons, other than criminal defendants, would prefer the evidence
be admitted to achieve conviction, especially if the defendant is as despicable as
defendant West. The privilege exists, however, to protect the social interest of
encouraging all persons to seek spiritual guidance and counseling. Thus, to
place the entire burden of enforcing the privilege on the defendant is to ignore
the social benefits sought to be preserved by protecting the communication. If
society as a whole benefits from the privilege, then society as a whole should be
concerned with protecting it.
If the court in West was trying to indicate that defendant impliedly waived
the privilege by making the communication in the presence of the minister's
wife, then the court should have taken notice of the statutory language requiring
the communicant to waive the privilege in open court.134 If the court intended
that the privilege never existed because the wife was present, then the court may
have taken too narrow a view of the privilege in light of the more liberal lan-
guage contained in the modem statute. The view of other courts that have ex-
tended the privilege to nonclergy persons who assisted ministers with their
duties 135 likewise seems to indicate the supreme court may have construed the
North Carolina privilege too strictly. Furthermore, many of the cases in other
jurisdictions in which the presence of a third party was held to destroy the
clergy-communicant privilege can be distinguished from the facts in West. For
example, in Milburn v. Haworth 136 the Colorado Supreme Court held the privi-
lege inapplicable to a communication made in the presence of a minister and
four other church members. The court in Milburn found that the statement
made by defendant was more in the nature of a casual conversation than a privi-
leged communication. 137 Likewise, in Knight v. Lee 138 the Indiana Supreme
Court refused to apply the privilege to a communication made to a church elder,
who was not a minister, because the communication made was not a "confession
within the meaning of the [statute]."' 139 In West no doubt existed as to the na-
ture of the communication; the privilege was deemed destroyed simply by the
presence of a third person.
Finally, the West court should have focused its attention on the policy
objectives underlying the clergy-communicant privilege to determine whether
these objectives were being furthered by its decision. If the benefits of having
such a privilege outweigh the detriments that result from excluding otherwise
reliable testimony, then the public policy goals of the privilege should be at the
heart of the court's decision. 4° Likewise, if these objectives are damaged by a
narrow interpretation of the privilege, then the court should carefully consider
this damage when attempting to narrowly construe the statutory language giving
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 125-31.
136. 47 Colo. 593, 108 P. 155 (1910).
137. Id.
138. 80 Ind. 201 (1881).
139. Id. at 203.
140. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
1406 [Vol. 65
rise to the privilege. 14 1
It seems difficult to imagine how the presence of the minister's wife could
undermine the objectives sought by recognizing the clergy-communicant privi-
lege. If the purpose behind the clergy-communicant privilege is to encourage
individuals to seek spiritual help and guidance in times of personal tragedy, and
to avoid the awkward situations created when ministers are compelled to testify
about conversations with parishioners during counseling, then why should the
presence of the minister's spouse or any other person aiding the minister defeat
the purpose of the communication? Although the court took the traditional ap-
proach afforded other privileges in holding that the presence of a third party
destroys confidentiality and the privilege along with it, little need or justification
appears for such a strict construction as it applies to this privilege. If courts are
willing to recognize other exceptions to the presence of a third party rule, for
example, when legal assistants are present during counseling by an attorney,
then a similar privilege should apply to the only person who may be available to
assist a minister in his or her work-the minister's spouse. Although this may
be viewed as an expansion of the clergy-communicant privilege, the privilege is
still subject to specified restrictions, and it seems unlikely that persons who dis-
close incriminating evidence while seeking spiritual counseling are likely to stray
far from the minister's office. In any event, if the minister is actually engaged in
rendering spiritual advice or counsel, the mere presence of the minister's spouse
seems to fall short of sufficient reason to destroy the privileged nature of the
communication.142
It is easy to sympathize with the court's ultimate outcome in the West deci-
sion. The defendant in that case stood accused of a despicable crime, and the
record contained more than enough evidence for a jury to return a guilty ver-
dict.14 3 However, to base a rule of law on the hard facts of one case is to ignore
the importance of consistent and carefully reasoned legal precedent. Society
pays a very heavy price for privileges. Every time a criminal defendant like
Jackson is sent back for a new trial, there exists the risk that a guilty person will
go unpunished simply because otherwise competent evidence-evidence that
141. Even if, as the court asserted in West, the confidentiality of a communication between a
minister and a communicant is damaged by the presence of a third party, this does not mean the
policy objectives promoted by the privilege are undermined. See Developments, supra note 53, at
1644. "Confidentiality is a means of attaining these goals, not an independent good in itself. When
disclosure occurs and confidentiality is to some degree compromised, it does not necessarily follow
that the values promoted and protected by confidentiality are correspondingly undermined." Id.
142. A separate but related issue concerns whether the minister's wife in West could have been
compelled to testify, or whether the privilege should also cover her. If the court had found that the
wife closely assisted the minister and therefore was not unlike the draft counselors in Verplank, then
certainly the wife should not have been compelled to testify. On the other hand, the language of the
statute codifying the privilege in North Carolina is quite specific and only applies to certain persons.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986) ("no priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science practitioner or
a clergyman or ordained minister of an established church shall be competent to testify"). For a
discussion of the need to extend the privilege to communications with lay counselors working within
a church, see W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 194-99 (1983).
143. In addition to the minister's testimony, the State introduced as evidence a tape recording
made by defendant in which he described sexual fantasies about the victim. Record on Appeal app.
at 1-5, West (No. 213A85). This evidence, coupled with the testimony of the victim, leaves little
doubt about defendant's guilt.
19871 EVIDENCE 1407
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
would establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt-must be kept from the jury.
In fact, sound logical arguments have been presented that society would best
benefit by the abolition of all privileges.1 44 But the North Carolina General
Assembly, like state legislatures in forty-nine other states, has decided that the
advantages of protecting these communications are worth the price paid. If the
courts make application of the privilege difficult for the public to understand,
however, both clergy and church members will be reluctant to rely on it to pro-
tect their communications. If this happens, the objectives of the privilege will be
defeated and all that will remain will be those situations in which a communica-
tion, like the one in Jackson, happens to fall within the privilege. The price for
the privilege is paid by having reliable evidence excluded from trial, but society
is still cheated of the benefits.
Until the general assembly takes a closer look at the clergy-communicant
privilege and establishes more distinct rules regarding its application, ministers
and the public are destined to make what they can of the law as the supreme
court has left it.145 Perhaps in future cases, however, the court will take greater
care in handling the assets of privileged communications, especially because the
people of North Carolina have already incurred the liabilities.
CHARLES DAVID CREECH
144. Jeremy Bentham, for example, attacked privileges with a vengeance. In describing the at-
torney-client privilege, Bentham stated its only purpose was to give assistance to the guilty, because
the innocent have little to gain by it and the guilty have only to lose if it is abolished. 5 J. BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 302 (J. Mill ed. 1827), reprinted in E. CLEARY & J. STRONG,
EVIDENCE 805-06 (3d ed. 1981).
145. A good starting point for the general assembly would be the Mississippi clergy-communi-
cant privilege, which provides: "A clergyman's secretary, stenographer, or clerk shall not be ex-
amined without the consent of the clergyman concerning any fact, the knowledge of which was
acquired in such capacity." MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22(4) (Supp. 1986).
1408 [Vol. 65
